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The Gaze and a Sufi Ethics of Vision in Majidi’s The Willow Tree: Form, Meaning, 
and the Real 
Abstract 
In his 2005 film The Willow Tree (Bīd-i Majnūn), Majid Majidi offers a complex moral commentary on the 
faculty of sight. To do so, the filmmaker draws from Sufi theories of gazing, in which desire must be for 
ultimate meaning (maʿnā), as conveyed through the vehicle of perceivable form (ṣūra), a distinction with 
both metaphysical and ethical implications. Majidi presents sight, when devoid of contemplation, as a 
sort of voyeurism, especially in contrast to the privacy and immediacy of speech and especially within the 
context of the modern city. Moreover, his use of a blind protagonist whose sight is suddenly restored 
makes Jacques Lacan’s (d. 1981) psychoanalysis an especially useful tool for understanding the 
implications of Majidi’s film: In Majidi, much as in Lacan, the gaze undoes barriers and a sense of self-
mastery, arousing the protagonist’s obsession with the void and an insatiable desire. Through references 
to Sufi ethical writings and a protagonist morally defeated by the image-centric media of contemporary 
urban Iran, The Willow Tree explores problems of representation and commodity fetishism. The resolution 
is a response to what might be called “moral voyeurism” that highlights and laments the artificiality of 
modernity’s objects of desire. 
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This paper considers Sufi theories of vision, especially Sufism’s metaphysical and normative 
distinction between form and meaning, to offer a reading of the gaze, using Iranian director Majīd 
Majīdī’s 2005 film Bīd-i Majnūn, or The Willow Tree. While the film presents vision from the 
perspective of Sufi moral psychology, drawing on Sufi theories of perception (or “witnessing” 
divine beauty, shuhūd), this presentation becomes further informed by Jacques Lacan’s (d. 1981) 
psychoanalytical theory of the gaze. Indeed, the film seems to answer to both models. Sufi 
psychology—as will be discussed in this paper—appears explicitly and throughout the film. 
Specifically, observations about the soul made by the Sufi ethicist and poet Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn 
Rūmī (d. 1273) frame The Willow Tree. Rūmī’s historical and literary presence abides throughout 
the film, in a number of ways, including in the fact that the protagonist is a professor of Persian 
Sufi literature specializing in the poetry of Rūmī. Lacanian psychoanalysis provides at the very 
least an incredibly useful means by which to understand the film’s protagonist’s arc, his conflicted 
relationship with sight, and the implications his moral downfall have ethically. Above simply its 
utility, Lacanian psychoanalysis seems to be referenced in a few of the film’s key scenes, not 
expressly, but by way of an uncanny resemblance to metaphors in Lacan’s writings and lectures. 
By highlighting image-centric media foregrounded in contemporary experience, Majīdī (Majidi) 
locates a classical Sufi-Islamic ethics of gazing in urban Iranian life. More specifically, Majidi’s 
depiction of voyeurism—contrasted with the privacy and immediacy of speech—comments on the 
artificiality of modernity’s objects of desire. On one hand, the film’s ethical commentary falls 
within the Persian literary and Sufi traditions, evoking a rich and longstanding debate about gazing 
within Islamic ethical texts and Sufi treatises. On the other hand, Majidi’s concern with modern, 
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urban settings yields a commentary on the embodied experience of modernity, an ethics of vision 
within the trappings of the city. 
 
The Narrative of The Willow Tree: Descent into a World of Forms 
 
 
The very narrative of The Willow Tree brings sight and its limits front and center: It is the story of 
a blind man who, through a miracle of science, regains his sight, only to lose it again at the film’s 
conclusion. Yūsuf, a professor in Tehran, was first made blind by an incident with fireworks when 
he was eight years old. At the start of the film, he lives with his attentive wife Ruʾyā and their 
daughter Maryam in the north of Tehran, near the mountains. Ruʾyā cares for him dotingly, typing 
his articles for him, managing almost every detail of his life, tending to their daughter, and 
generally showing an altruistic sense of concern for him. She volunteers at a school for the blind 
and has a range of emotions that might be called saintly, for she never shows anger, only 
disappointment, when it comes to Yūsuf’s later turning away from her.  
The film begins with only the sound of Yūsuf’s voice humbly addressing God. He has 
learned of a tumor in his eye that might be malignant, which causes him to fear losing his life. In 
total darkness, the sound of his intimacy with God surrounds us, a privacy and immediacy that 
represents Yūsuf’s degree of maʿrifat, that is, his “cognizance” of the Real (that is, God, called 
“the Real” often in Sufi literature). It is followed by a visual metaphor: Two pieces of wood racing 
downstream. The one representing him becomes trapped midway through, portending the events 
that will unfold in which he—in the middle of his life—will suffer from a regression that disturbs 
his intimacy with God and disorients him. That the film begins only with words, (words spoken to 
God) followed by an image of failure, foretells Yūsuf’s moral failing. It captures, moreover, the 
theme of the film that it is in meaning (or language) and not form (or images) that one finds solace 
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and contentment. As the scene shifts from blackness and the sound of Yūsuf’s voice to a scene of 
rushing water, Majidi is careful to increase the sound of the water, thereby giving us a sense of 
both the visual and aural dimensions of the scene, that is, both the scene from the perspective of 
the omniscient cinematic viewer and the scene as it is for the visually-impaired Yūsuf. Thereby, 
he presents us with a problem—the gap between Yūsuf’s experience and ours—that will be 
resolved temporarily in the film. 
The disorientation that Yūsuf experiences begins on his return home to Tehran from Paris, 
where treatment for the tumor in his eye has led to a discovery that his retinas have remained 
sensitive to light. A corneal transplant restores his sight. Now back in Tehran, walking down a 
hallway and into the airport’s greeting area, Yūsuf sees a large crowd. Family, friends, strangers, 
as well as blind individuals, give Yūsuf the sort of welcome usually reserved for returning sports 
champions. The decisive problem at this reception is that Yūsuf cannot identify his wife in the 
crowd. Majidi here uses a succession of close-ups, from the perspective of Yūsuf, to convey his 
reasoning process, as his eyes move from face to face. As he had previously, when blind, referred 
to her as an “angel,” because of her virtuous traits, it only makes sense, then, once granted sight, 
that Yūsuf’s eyes seek out a woman who is angelic in form. He has not yet discovered that, in this 
visible world outside of his mind, form and meaning do not correspond: His angelic wife, whom 
he cannot recognize, appears to be a random, plain-looking woman. In this climactic scene, his 
eyes land instead on Parī, the young sister to his uncle’s wife. Her name means “fairy,” or a female 
benevolent counterpart to the demon. It is a word that derives from a more ancient Iranian term for 
a category of demonic figures akin to the “sorceress, witch, or enchantress.”1 In Rūmī’s poetry—
always center-stage in The Willow Tree—the parī is often a bewitching, coy beauty, never far from 
being the female counterpart to the demon or dīw. The parī has an especially relevant role in the 
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poetry of Farīd al-Dīn ʿAṭṭār, a major Sufi Persian poet, Rūmī’s main source of influence 
poetically, and a source of allusion in Majidi’s Color of Paradise.2 In ʿAṭṭār’s long narrative, the 
Ilāhī-nāma, a prince becomes enamored with marrying the daughter of the king of the parīs. She 
represents the pinnacle of natural beauty, and the prince’s yearning for her occasions an extended 
warning not to become overpowered by lust. Likewise, for Majidi, Parī seems to represent the 
allurement of form, especially female form, over meaning. We would say that Yūsuf prefers her 
physical beauty to the moral beauty of his wife, but in the terms used by Rūmī and other Sufi 
metaphysicians, Yūsuf’s preference is for form over meaning. 
Yūsuf’s preference of form over meaning becomes exceedingly clear in a scene where 
Ruʾyā discovers her husband’s clandestine desire for Parī. Yūsuf obsesses over not just Parī, but, 
at one point in the film, over a mere picture of her, a two-dimensional object. That is, his attention 
is not just on her form, but a depiction of her form. This very picture appears intermittently in the 
film, each time shaming Yūsuf for his desires, until, in one of the film’s final scenes, Yūsuf sets 
fire to all the documents and books in his library, and this picture appears charred, sinking to the 
bottom of his pool. Even his volume of Rūmī’s master narrative poem, The Spiritual Couplets 
(Mathnawī-i Maʿnawī), cannot escape his wrath. Having regained his sight, his dissatisfaction has 
gone from mere ennui to a rejection of everything from his former life, including his post at the 
university and even, in a momentary tantrum, his beloved mother, who ends up heartbroken and 
in the hospital. His wife has, after all, left him: While Ruʾyā’s shock might be common to any 
spouse who has experienced infidelity, it is also a commentary on infidelity. That is, Yūsuf’s lack 
of gratitude, his lack of loyalty, and his failure to love result from a preference of form over 
meaning. Eventually, Yūsuf, now all alone, loses his sight again and wanders Tehran in anger. The 
film ends with his repentance. 
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Significantly, the last object that Yūsuf sees before his blindness returns is a letter from a 
wise friend, along with a picture of Yūsuf next to a willow tree when he was still blind, an image 
from which the film draws its name. The letter from his friend, Murtaḍā, and his subsequent loss 
of sight, begins a return to meaning for Yūsuf, which he lost the ability to perceive during his 
narcissistic crisis and his yearning for (and even worship of) form. Murtaḍā, the friend who has 
written letter, is a mysterious figure who spent time with Yūsuf while both were in hospital in 
France. He is the voice of wisdom and the spiritual guide, akin to Rūmī’s legendary friend Shams-
i Tabrīzī (d. ca. 1247). Throughout the film, Murtaḍā repeatedly offers walnuts to Yūsuf. His 
insistence on Yūsuf’s eating walnuts captures the metaphor of spiritually informed perception, the 
film’s pivotal metaphor: Yūsuf must seek the kernel (the flesh of the walnut, representing 
meaning), in place of the shell (representing form). The walnut has a shell that must be cracked to 
get to what matters, its flesh. Rūmī himself compares the form of words to “a peel,” and the 
meaning of those words to “the pith,” or, using an alternate metaphor, form as “a drawing” that 
lacks life, while meaning is “the soul.”3 This scene seems to imply that Murtaḍā has preternaturally 
willed Yūsuf’s return to a state of blindness which begins his redemption. From the perspective of 
disability studies, Murtaḍā’s antitherapeutic act results in a twofold message about Yūsuf’s 
blindness. On one hand, it presents blindness as the best and most suitable state for our protagonist. 
To imply that those who can see, should see, and those who cannot, should not, seems to me to be 
an ableist apologetics. On the other hand, as Emily Jane O’Dell has observed, the film, along with 
other Iranian films with themes of disability, offers “a protected space” for “existential, 
theological, and spiritual questions” about human suffering and disability.4 O’Dell’s observation 
might be extended by saying that the problem of blindness is secondary to the film. Its use of a 
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blind protagonist is mainly a vehicle for contemplating an ethics of gazing informed by Sufi moral 
psychology. 
 
Majid Majidi’s “Spiritual Cinema” and The Willow Tree 
 
What has separated Majidi from other major Iranian filmmakers is his use of religious allegory, a 
thematic difference that affects the visual and stylistic features of his films as well. Like Muḥsin 
Makhmalbāf (Mohsen Makhmalbaf), in whose film Boycott (1985) Majidi began his cinematic 
career as an actor, and like ʿAbbās Kiārustamī (Abbas Kiarostami), Majidi usually employs a style 
of filmmaking that makes use of a poetic sensibility, a slow pace, and long takes.5 While 
Kiarostami’s long shots have rightly been described as assuming a “secular nature” and a lack of 
transcendent significance, Majidi’s long shots often indicate nature’s silent ability to attest to 
God’s presence and beauty.6 This religiously allegorical dimension of Majidi’s filmmaking, 
classifying his work as “spiritual cinema” in Iran (sīnamā-yi maʿnāgarā), has meant that his 
productions not only remain in distinction from other well-known and mostly secular Iranian 
directors, but also have met with the distaste of certain critics of Iranian cinema.7 Despite his 
interest in the philosophical dimensions of Iranian cinema, including Majid Majidi’s films, 
Farhang Erfani sees Majidi’s “sentimentality” as an artistic apologetics for the ideology of Islamic 
governance, an “ideologically appeasing and reassuring” production of a state-driven religious 
patriarchy.8 More conclusive is Hamid Dabashi’s dismissal of Majidi’s filmmaking—particularly 
the films Children of Heaven (1997) and The Color of Paradise (1999)—as “a mediocre imitation” 
of a high Iranian cinematic style.9 Dabashi’s statement results from his disfavor for therapeutic 
cinema, which is to say, film that presents a meaningful (and in this case religious and allegorical) 
response to the modern human condition, as opposed to film stripped of “any trace of verbality” 
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that is “post-ideological.”10 My response to such criticisms has been that, in fact, Majidi’s films 
go beyond Dabashi’s poststructuralist expectations to present a theodicy of modern life in Iran, a 
theodicy that no particular political ideology can claim, despite Erfani’s refusal or inability to 
distinguish between Islamic metaphysics and Islamic governance.11 As will be seen here, beyond 
theodicy, Majidi’s The Willow Tree teaches the modern subject how to see meaningfully, that is, 
how to perceive a secularized world in a spiritually meaningful way. When we consider the manner 
in which, as Talal Asad has argued, changes in language to suit the needs of modernity have altered 
“not only the way of life [for modern Christians] but also the body and its senses,” Majidi’s 
interpretation of the senses as measured by their ability to perceive meaning seems to offer a 
language for a modern, Muslim, Iranian mode of being.12 
Aside from his two latest productions, Majid Majidi’s films—again, like those of 
Makhmalbaf and Kiarostami—focus on life in Iran for those whom mainstream urban Iranian life 
usually ignores, that is, children, the enslaved, ethnic minorities, and refugees. The Willow Tree, 
with its blind protagonist, is no exception to such spotlighting of the underprivileged. Since The 
Willow Tree is Majidi’s second film with a blind protagonist, one can point to a symbolic 
correspondence between blindness itself and spiritual vision. Majidi’s The Color of Paradise 
depicted a young boy, Muḥammad, who reads God’s presence in all things, despite his blindness. 
His sense of hearing, along with his sense of touch and belief in a metaphysical universality to 
braille, allows him to see what others cannot. This “cannot” is especially true for Muḥammad’s 
father, whose ingratitude for life’s beauties and spite toward his son leads him to become a tragic, 
fallen figure. Such spiritual insight becomes lost and regained in The Willow Tree. It is lost when 
sight is gained and our blind protagonist becomes neglectful of God. It then becomes regained 
when his sight is once again lost. One significant difference between The Willow Tree and The 
7
Zargar: The Gaze and a Sufi Ethics of Vision in Majidi’s The Willow Tree
Published by DigitalCommons@UNO, 2020
Color of Paradise is that The Willow Tree’s blind protagonist is an adult, which lends itself to not 
only a somewhat more profound verbal reflection upon his state, but also the visual temptations of 
sexual attraction, crucial to the film’s themes. In accordance with Iran’s “Ministry of Culture and 
Islamic Guidance” (Wizārat-i Farhang wa Irshād-i Islāmī, or “Irshād” for short), such sexual 
attraction is usually intimated in the film, represented by Yūsuf’s long glances and interest in the 
faces of young women. 
 
The Philosophical Context of Sufi Theories of Gazing 
 
 
The gaze, in Majidi’s film, leaves the viewer unfulfilled, such that desire engenders desire. In Sufi 
gazing practices, such desire must be spiritual, contemplative, and one might say “Platonic” in 
nature, even if it is conveyed through the vehicle of human beauty. In Lacanian theory, the gaze 
undoes barriers and a sense of self-mastery, for underlying it is the threat of an encounter with the 
real. Indeed, The Willow Tree presents sight itself, when devoid of contemplation, as a form of 
voyeurism. Sight allows for distance, and distance allows for a freedom from culpability. Within 
the field of that freedom, the subject’s selfishness reigns, leading to an outlook that might be called 
moral voyeurism, as the subject becomes increasingly isolated, and the gaze cannot be satiated. 
The protagonist of The Willow Tree comes to realize that sight, while a medium for beauty, can 
also be a vehicle of ingratitude, an ingratitude that tears apart his life. It is this theme of sight as 
gratitude that is most relevant to Sufi theories of beholding divine beauty, not only because of the 
salience of gratitude as a virtue in Sufi moral psychology or in the Qur’an.13 Through gratitude, 
ultimately, the protagonist realizes that perception must acknowledge the metaphysical superiority 
of “meaning” over “form,” terms considered below and described in detail by Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī.  
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The terms “form” (ṣūra) and “meaning” (maʿnā) have their roots in the psychology of Abū 
ʿAlī Ḥusayn ibn Sinā (d. 1037), known in the Latin West as “Avicenna,” who forged his model of 
the faculties by refining Aristotle’s (d. 322 BCE). For Aristotle, imagination, or phantasia, differs 
from perception, as well as from the mind. It is the faculty that produces mental images, whether 
one is dreaming, thinking, or remembering. Later heirs to Aristotelian conceptions of the inner 
senses—such as Galen, Plotinus, and Nemesius—advanced the relationship between the senses, 
the body, and perception, which again became reinterpreted by philosophers writing in Arabic.14 
Avicenna added to imagination a faculty shared by animals and humans, namely, estimation 
(wahm), an internal sense that complements the external sense of sight. While sight perceives 
forms, estimation perceives that which has no form, or that which is separate from matter. It 
perceives intentions or what we might call “meaning” (maʿnā). To describe the distinction between 
form and meaning Avicenna offered a now famous example: the sheep’s encounter with a wolf. 
On one hand, the sheep perceives the wolf’s form, that which requires matter and can be called a 
body. On the other hand, the sheep perceives the wolf’s intention to harm, which is its “meaning.” 
From the sheep’s perspective, the wolf’s form tells the sheep where the wolf is, where it is going, 
its color, shape, and size. Yet the wolf’s meaning or intention tells the sheep to flee. 
Avicenna’s idea that sensory and non-sensory meet in a human faculty became a critical 
point of discussion within Sufism, which adopted and reimagined much of Avicennan psychology, 
though often within a framework that better suited Sufism’s focus on the states and stations of the 
“heart” or human spirit. In Sufi writings, Avicenna’s observations became combined with a 
tradition of contemplating divine beauty through the senses. This provided a vocabulary to some 
for a specific variety of such contemplation, which focused on divine qualities in human form, 
usually the faces of beardless young men, a practice called shāhidbāzī in Persian. Some Sufi 
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ethicists advocated shāhidbāzī, and others (such as Rūmī) opposed it.15 To prohibit licentious 
gazing, especially that which might have led to pederasty, classical Sufi texts condemned gazing 
that goes no further than form. The gazer who appreciates merely form appreciates beauty on the 
level of the basest animal instincts within each human being. Conversely, one who gazes upon 
form as a bridge to meaning, discerning divinity within the object of sight, hits the mark, so that a 
person is embodied and yet perceives through the senses that which transcends the body. For many 
Sufi writers interested in such a mode of contemplation, the non-sensory came to indicate the 
supersensory. To this effect, “intention” or “meaning,” are not sufficient translations for the word 
maʿnā that appears in Sufi writings, such as those of Rūmī. Maʿnā signifies the supersensory 
reality, the divine effusion, that has assumed some sort of form for the human perceiver. This 
model of form and meaning appears in countless classical Sufi texts, especially during the high 
period of Sufi cosmology, that period often subject to later commentaries, during which prominent 
figures made claims about witnessing human beauty. Such figures included Rūmī, Muḥyī al-Dīn 
ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 1240), Fakhr al-Dīn ʿIrāqī (d. 1289), and Saʿīd al-Dīn al-Farghānī (d. 1300).  
Rūmī’s views on form and meaning function as a backdrop to The Willow Tree (where 
Rūmī’s person and poetry receive frequent explicit and implicit mention), and hence deserve some 
discussion here. In an extended passage of the Mathnawī, Rūmī declares that gazing upon the 
sensory beauties around us was meant to be a reminder of the Divinely Beautiful. To become 
obsessed with form is to prefer that which is ultimately unreal to the Real. Instead, one must see 
the unreal as a means to perceiving the Real. He makes his point by alluding to extra-Qur’anic 
narratives about Joseph (of the Book of Genesis), whose master’s wife, Zulaykhā, has become 
infatuated with him. To seduce him, she has filled her quarters with beautiful images of herself “so 
that Joseph might gaze upon her accidentally”:16 
10
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 In order to have Joseph look in her direction,  
she made the house replete with depictions of herself, deceptively— 
such that any way that gorgeous-faced young man might look,  
he would see her face, involuntarily. 
God made for those whose sight has light 
six directions as places of realization for His signs, 
so that when they behold each living and visible thing,  
they gaze within the meadow of Lordly comeliness, 
which is why He—with such an army—commanded:  
Anywhere you turn, there is His face.17  
 
The effect that this realization has on the knower of God is a sense of divine omnipresence, 
allowing him or her to gaze upon human beauty, while simultaneously seeing that beauty’s origins. 
Such a person “sees the comeliness of the Real in the face of a heavenly girl.”18 Rūmī’s vision of 
the inner human world—what seems to be the imagination—is one which creates manifold forms 
from sensory knowledge, a multiplicity and variegation that should lead the seer back to the 
unchanging source from which everything comes: 
In that fortress of the goodly essence of all forms 
five doors lead to the sea [of the unseen] and five to the land [of the seen]: 
Five of them correspond to senses leading to color and smell, 
while five of them correspond to inner senses, seeking secrets.  
from these [external and internal senses], one thousand forms, pictures, and images 
started dancing happily from one end to the other. 
Try not to get too drunk from these goblets of form, 
lest you become an idol-maker and idol-worshipper.19 
 
The danger, according to Rūmī, is that one become a worshipper of form, missing the 
significance that form represents—namely, the spiritual, or what he and his contemporaries called 
“meaning”: 
Pass by the goblets of form, do not stop there! 
Yes, the wine is in the cup, but it is not of the cup.20 
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Form is a medium by which one encounters meaning, or, if one prefers, it is the seed or 
kernel one seeks in the husk of any plant. Rūmī uses the metaphor of the seed and husk once again, 
this time extending it to a miraculous extra-Qur’anic account of rocks having become flour for 
Abraham miraculously. To Rūmī—borrowing from Ashʿarī theologians—this change shows that 
even something as essentially related as cause-and-effect is merely a playground for God’s will, 
much in the way that form has been granted its status as form merely in order to convey 
formlessness: 
“O Adam, seek out my heart-enchanting meaning— 
speak of abandoning the husk-and-form of the wheat kernel.” 
Since rocks miraculously became flour for Abraham, God’s friend, 
Know that wheat has been deposed from flour-making, o intelligent one! 
In existence, form comes from formlessness, 
just as smoke comes to us from fire. 
Even the most minor flaw in the traits of a form-given thing 
will lead to weariness, when you see it over and over again. 
But formlessness will leave you completely bewildered— 
creating one hundred different instruments from its instrument-less way.21  
 
To become bogged down by form, infatuated with it, unwilling to move beyond it is to 
miss the message of existence. It is like the person so obsessed with the sound of words that he or 
she fails to listen to their meaning and cannot understand them. 
This problem of interpretation is hinted at in the names of the film’s characters. Yūsuf (the 
Biblical “Joseph”) is Islam and the Qur’an’s most well-known dream interpreter, considered to be 
the father of dream interpretation.22 The protagonist’s wife’s name, Ruʾyā, means “dream-vision,” 
suggesting that his wife, in terms of “meaning,” possesses divine beauty, through her character. 
Her name thus indicates that she is not only the appropriate direction for Yūsuf’s heart, but also 
for his divinely-granted ability to interpret the world. He is, after all, a skilled interpreter of the 
mysterious, a scholar who comments on mystical poetry, before his moral downfall, after which 
he relinquishes this pursuit.23 The larger significance of dream interpretation within this cultural 
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sphere should not be missed. In her ethnographic study of dreams in contemporary Cairo, Amira 
Mittermaier tells us that reading dreams is an initiatic tradition for contemporary Muslim dream 
interpreters, where even the greatest of Muslim dream interpreters, Ibn Sīrīn (d. 729), is said to 
have inherited his abilities from a dream of Yūsuf/Joseph.24 This initiatic tradition extends beyond 
dreams to the interpretation of God’s signs in general, and, in the famous narrative of Rūmī’s life, 
describes the poet’s relationship with his beloved friend Shams. The film presents such a 
relationship with the dreamlike character of Murtaḍā, who knows facts about Yūsuf’s life without 
ever being told them, who recites love poetry in moments of anxiety, and who offers words of 
wisdom to Yūsuf, including lines that are quoted in the film’s title, The Willow Tree. Yūsuf had 
mentioned to Murtaḍā that, were he ever granted sight, he would want to see a willow tree, which 
brought him luck as a child. After he gains sight, Yūsuf shows disdain for planting saplings (which 
appear to be willow saplings) at a school for the blind. He receives a letter from Murtaḍā—toward 
the end of the film, immediately before Yūsuf’s blindness returns—asking him if he ever even 
bothered to look for a willow tree. He had not, pointing to the simple appreciation he had for nature 
before his moral downfall, an appreciation that has since been lost. This indicates that Yūsuf has 
ceased to be an interpreter of the natural world. He has forgotten his ability to read the signs of 
God in nature, as one would interpret a dream (and as Majidi’s other blind protagonist, 
Muhammad, does in The Color of Heaven). Instead of being an interpreter of beauty, Yūsuf has 
become its consumer. 
 
The Gaze, The Real, and Majidi’s Resolution 
One can hardly discuss gazing in the context of film without considering Jacques Lacan’s 
psychoanalytical theory, to which Majidi seems to nod at critical moments in his film. Voyeurism, 
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such an integral theme within The Willow Tree, has particular relevance to Lacan’s view of the 
relationship between the subject, the other, and the gaze that links them. For Lacan, voyeurism is 
an act of the subject looking for the absence of the phallus. He tries to see the “object as absence,” 
but experiences a “conflagration of shame” when he realizes that he himself is an object of the 
gaze as well.25 Like the moment of being caught in the act of ogling, the voyeuristic gaze ends up 
making the subject the object of his own gaze. The weight of his gaze falls on himself. Since the 
gaze in Majidi’s film is most often directed toward women—women that Yūsuf finds attractive—
Laura Mulvey’s work on the topic of the Lacanian gaze in film helps us see how Majidi’s depiction 
of a voyeuristic subject, lying firmly in Sufi theories of gazing, might benefit from and even allude 
to a consideration of the Lacanian gaze. (Whether this correspondence results from Majidi’s own 
intentions as a filmmaker is impossible for me to determine at this point, and, considering the 
pertinence of Lacanian theory to film studies in general, perhaps moot.) 
While Mulvey’s insights are, to a degree, useful, they must be seen within the context of 
Sufi theories of form and meaning to be applied to The Willow Tree. Mulvey uses Lacanian 
psychoanalysis to uncover the manner in which “the unconscious of patriarchal society has 
structured film form” in gratification of the male gaze.26 She argues that woman—or the female 
form—serves a twofold purpose for the patriarchal unconscious. The female form symbolizes the 
fear of castration and her maternal ability to nurture the male child transcending that fear.27 As an 
object in film, the female form becomes a “bearer of meaning, not maker of meaning.” 28 
“Meaning,” for Mulvey, carries a sense much different from what it has in Rūmī’s metaphysics. 
In the latter, meaning is not made. Rather, it emanates and can be observed through the vehicle of 
form. For Mulvey, however, meaning signifies one’s agency in a narrative; the female form is but 
an instrument in a patriarchal fantasy. Within Sufism, theorists located the problem with such 
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gazing not in the element of harm or the solidification of patriarchy, but rather in the disservice to 
oneself to achieve complete human potential. The lustful gazer remaining on the level of form 
abandons the completion of higher attributes—that is, virtues—in favor of responding to animal 
passions. Yet Lacanian analysis does help us understand a pivotal scene in the film, a mirror scene 
that seems to differ in significance from mirror scenes in another of Majidi’s films.29 At a climactic 
point in the film, moments after Yūsuf has gained sight for the first time in his adult life, he leaves 
his room in curiosity and jubilation. He stops when he encounters his reflection in a glass.  
Jacques Lacan’s theory of the gaze places a crucial stage of formation at a child’s self-
viewing at a mirror, where he or she first internalizes the gaze and experiences a sense of being an 
object of sight. It is a stage of production for the self-image, creating the reinforced ego, because 
the reflection allows the child a simulated mastery over the body.30 In this case, the encounter with 
his reflection begins a change within Yūsuf that will eventually lead to his narcissistic treatment 
of others, including his wife and daughter. It precedes everything, including his return home to 
Tehran and his gradual fall into despair. That fall is marked by a proclamation to his mother, made 
before he destroys his library in a fit of rage, which makes it clear that Yūsuf’s self-regard, 
beginning with his glance into the mirror, began a descent in which Yūsuf must absolve himself 
of what Julia Kristeva calls the original “feeling of emptiness” at the heart of all neuroses.31 
Kristeva, in her reading of Lacan, argues that the subject’s self-recognition creates ab-ject (that 
aspect of subjectivity that must be repulsed) and a void; the void must be met with something, and 
so begins the process of producing signifiers. This happens, of course, in the infantile stage, but 
Majidi has capably replicated the process in adulthood, by having Yūsuf gain sight as an adult. His 
first gaze is at himself in the mirror, as has been mentioned. The first person he recognizes is his 
mother. His father is completely absent throughout the film, as if he does not exist, in a manner 
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similar to the “Name of the Father” in Lacanian psychoanalysis, wherein the Father exists as law, 
guiding toward himself by his absence. As Yūsuf struggles to fill the void, he begins to turn away 
from anything resembling his mother, the ab-ject, including his own wife (whom he accuses of 
playing the role of his mother). Thus, when Yūsuf’s mother asks why he shows little concern for 
his wife, who has left him, and she spots the picture he cherishes of himself standing next to Parī, 
he exclaims: 
I don’t need anyone anymore. I want to have the life I deserve… I want to live the 
way I please. Yes, I want to live the way I please. I want to live the way I please.  
 
The gaze—Yūsuf’s first instance of sight in the film, and his first moment of sight during 
his adult life—begins a life that promises Yūsuf pleasure, yet also revolves around himself. This 
new life leaves him agitated, wandering, and often engaging in voyeurism.  
A number of moments in the film indicate that Yūsuf has become a voyeur, or even a 
scopophile, considering that he eventually makes little effort to curb or cover up his voyeuristic 
desires.32 Upon his arrival, Yūsuf seems unable to control his long stare, gazing upon his uncle’s 
wife’s sister, Parī. Indeed, every time she enters a scene, Yūsuf becomes visually fixated. Later in 
the film, on the metro, he stares at a young lady. Each of these cases has something in common. 
Younger, their beauty enhanced by artificial adornments such as hair-highlights, jewelry, and nail 
polish, the women at whom Yūsuf stares stand in contrast to his wife, to whose natural look Yūsuf 
reacts with an indifference bordering on revulsion. To use Mulvey’s language, Yūsuf takes women 
as objects and subjects them to a patriarchal gaze, but is particularly interested in a certain artificial 
female aesthetic associated with urban, “Tehrani” women, an aesthetic most manifestly explored 
in the art of Shirin Aliabadi.33 From the perspective of Islamic norms, the immorality of his glares 
is underlined by the wedding ring on the finger of the young lady in the metro. From the 
perspective of Sufi psychology, Yūsuf’s shortcoming is in seeing human beauty as its end, 
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underlined by his interest in artificial beauty. Beauty should propel the gazer beyond itself, to a 
sense of bewilderment. In the terms used in Sufi writings on gazing, one must look at form in order 
to look beyond it. Gazing must end in witnessing divine qualities, the very qualities called 
“meaning.”34 What Mulvey calls an “object” of the male gaze might, in terms of Sufi psychology, 
be called “form” lacking all appreciation for meaning.  
While Mulvey’s Lacanian analysis of the male gaze provides some useful entryways into 
Sufi conceptions of gazing, and gazing as a theme in Majidi’s film, recent developments on 
Lacan’s gaze are even more helpful. For Mulvey, a Lacanian analysis of the gaze contributes to 
the breaking down of patriarchal structures, such as those in Hollywood cinema, because—as she 
states—“analyzing pleasure, or beauty, destroys it,” which would allow us “to make way for a 
total negation of the ease and plenitude of the narrative fiction film.”35 While this has truth, it falls 
short of offering us a moral alternative to gazing—as an act of male mastery—more broadly, 
beyond film. Moreover, traditional Lacanian theory, the basis for Mulvey’s argument, has lost its 
place of privilege in film studies because of the lack of empirical evidence supporting it.36 Yet 
such dismissals of traditional Lacanian theory often react to an interpretation of the gaze at 
variance with Lacan’s own formulation of the gaze. “The gaze is not,” according to Todd 
McGowan, “the look of the subject at the object, but the point at which the object looks back,” 
bringing the spectator into the image and disrupting the spectator’s sense of power.37 The gaze is 
what McGowan calls the “site of a traumatic encounter with the [r]eal,” where the word “real” 
signifies Lacan’s conception of some experience beyond human symbolic comprehension.38  
It is Lacan’s “real” that is missing from traditional Lacanian theory, according to 
McGowan. Thus, traditional Lacanian film theorists, such as Mulvey, identify the gaze with the 
perspective of the camera and that of the male protagonist, so that gazing means the subject’s 
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mastery of an object and the patriarchal domination of both narrator and viewer over an object. 
Lacan’s theory before its adoption into film theory, however, was bereft of a Foucauldian and 
Nietzschean conflation of desire with power.39 The gaze, for Lacan, is not mastery but rather an 
encounter with a void so disconcerting that the subject loses his or her sense of mastery.40 Kaja 
Silverman also contends with understandings, such as those of Mulvey, in which cinema is 
spectacle, where the camera’s perspective stands for that of the spectator’s perspective. For 
Silverman, the camera’s perspective represents something else: the “grave” of the eye, the other, 
or the view of some “nonliving agent,” an awareness of camera as camera.41 She differs from 
Lacan in that Lacan’s definition of the screen was an ahistorical one, one where the camera told 
us something timeless about the psyche.42 Instead, the camera as “a representational system and a 
network of material practices” changes the way we see the screen, as well as the gaze represented 
by the screen.43 While Silverman agrees that human vision is always mediated, she makes a 
compelling case that our socially embedded relationships determine that mediation. This helps us 
see Majidi’s camera as positioned within contemporary Islamic norms, norms that contend with 
the artificiality of modernity. The gaze, informed in part by a metaphysics in which God is the 
Real, is met with a moral resolution. The gaze’s disorientation and danger, in The Willow Tree, 
become resolved by the comfort of words, the very words that Yūsuf speaks to God when blind, 
or those that his mentor and friend writes to him in letters, or—and it is this that frames the film 
most—those words by which spiritual masters such as Rūmī have communicated realities beyond 
those that can be seen. 
In Sufism and other strands of Islamic thought, the “Real” signifies God as the Absolute, 
abstracted from conceptions of Him and from His relationships to creation. Majidi’s film 
reconciles Sufi conceptions of the “Real” with a Lacanian “real”: the metaphysical Real, that is, 
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the objective of all appreciation of beauty, lies in wait for those willing to move beyond form, and 
yet Yūsuf becomes inhibited from such a traversal because of his encounter with the Lacanian real, 
his glance at the mirror that begins his descent into an obsession with the void. Worded in terms 
of desire, the gaze elicits a desire that engenders more desire, desire that cannot be satiated or 
appeased. The Willow Tree depicts this conundrum in one of its final scenes: Murtaḍā asks Yūsuf, 
in a letter, if his eyes have become “satiated from watching.” Of course, the eyes cannot become 
satiated; satiety does not apply to sight, and it is this that makes Yūsuf suffer. In film, fantasy 
usually offers a resolution to the desire engendered by the gaze. Hollywood films mollify the 
irreconcilable gaze through fantasy narratives, but still have value because—McGowan asserts—
there remains the possibility of “an encounter with the gaze that would otherwise be obscured in 
our experience of social reality.”44 Majidi’s film does not offer a resolution through fantasy. 
Rather, The Willow Tree resolves the gaze theologically—focusing on a more logocentric sense 
than that of sight, namely, hearing. Yūsuf, at the end of the film, returns to a world of darkness 
and sound, which is also a world of intimacy and speech with God. Yūsuf’s salvation lies in speech, 
in his discourse with God, that is in, words, where meaning and form—for him and for most of 
us—are inseparable. Put differently, Majidi’s resolution is to provide language as a means to 
circumventing form, pursuing meaning, and encountering the Sufi conception of the Real. 
Perhaps no scene represents Majidi’s understanding of the aforementioned problem of form 
and meaning better than Yūsuf’s visit to his uncle’s jewelry store. Delighted to have his adult 
nephew see his business, Yūsuf’s uncle takes him into his boutique, which is clean and well-
furnished. In it, wealthy, well-dressed customers sit selecting merchandise from a catalogue. The 
uncle invites Yūsuf to follow him to see where the jewelry is made, and they enter a private 
elevator that descends into a basement. Here Majidi has the camera assume Yūsuf’s field of sight. 
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In stark contrast to what was above, Yūsuf sees—and we see—a dark, cavernous area, lit only by 
the fires of the smiths who melt gold and forge the jewelry. They never look at Yūsuf. Their lack 
of acknowledgement to his presence lends to their work an aura of something constantly ongoing, 
natural, or even cosmic. Majidi then shows us Yūsuf’s face, in a close-up, both mesmerized and, 
to a degree, horrified. One of the fires bursts, and the sparks cause Yūsuf to panic momentarily, 
brushing his clothing to ensure that no part of him has been lit. He then notices a smoldering drop 
of gold, on the ground, as the scene draws to a close. Looking at the scene from the perspective of 
Sufi poetics and cosmology, the upper level of the store seems to represent mediated creation. That 
is, its luxurious and visually-appealing setting corresponds to human expectations: It is the shell 
of things, what we see and encounter as reality, but what we must move beyond to reach the kernel. 
The basement, however, corresponds to the strange and indeed barely comprehensible manner in 
which meaning takes on form, or words emerge to try to convey the real/Real, even if they 
ultimately fail.  
This scene, in other words, points to a way in which one might read Sufi conceptions of 
form/meaning in light of Lacanian psychoanalysis. For Lacan, the real represents all that which 
precedes words, that is, human experiences as of yet unsymbolized.45 Human experiences become 
bound by language, and it is then that they properly “exist.” Lacan’s real, then, is outside of 
existence—existence as a field of human awareness subject to being known. In the earliest stages 
of human development, unsymbolized experiences take on symbolization, as they become tied to 
words. Those words are the tongue of the Other, or even the tongue of the central “other” in most 
children’s lives, the mother, because—at this stage—there is really no self, no subject, but rather 
a subject in formation.46 From this formation comes desire, a desire that can neither be expunged 
nor satiated. It cannot be expunged because everything known is symbolized; to efface desire 
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would mean to efface everything the subject knows, or, rather, subjectivity itself. Desire cannot be 
satiated by its objects of desire because there will always be a distance between the words that 
shape our desires and that which brought them into creation. There is a similar dynamic at work 
here, in this scene of The Willow Tree. The futility of longing for form appears in the protagonist’s 
encounter with glitter itself—arguably the most salient representation of the superficial nature of 
human desires, namely, gold. To the customers upstairs, seeing the gold as having been given 
shape and made into precious objects, this gold has worth. Yet, descending into the basement of 
that gilded jewelry’s creation, Yūsuf witnesses the process by which desire is formed, a process 
frightening in its barbarity, unsettling because it is so far removed from the finished product. In 
the language of Rūmī, Yūsuf has had a glimpse into the placement of the kernel in the shell, while 
the customers upstairs enjoy merely the shell. Or, more precisely, what Yūsuf has come to see is 
the transience of worldly beauty—the dunyā, or “lower world,” which is disparagingly compared 
to gold in the Qur’an, as gold has only relative value, while the afterlife has real value.47  
It is, in fact, the theme of perspective that ties together the film’s major concerns: sight, the 
meaninglessness of form, and proper awareness of one’s relationship with God. These become 
bound to an image that appears twice in the film, namely, the ant crawling in darkness. It is likely 
that I have pinpointed the passage of Rūmī’s Mathnawī to which Majīdī alludes in centering this 
image of the ant. It is an image that serves both as the film’s final scene (walking across a braille 
letter that Yūsuf keeps in his copy of Rūmī’s Mathnawī) and, earlier in the film, as the first object 
that Yūsuf is able to see (walking across his hospital bedroom windowsill). Majīdī is careful to use 
a close-up shot, magnifying the ant, and portraying its slow movement in real time. As one can see 
in the translation below, Rūmī interprets an ant’s crawling as a matter of limited perspective, 
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relating it to the problem of human vision, both vision in the metaphorical sense (as “insight”) and 
in the literal sense (as “sight”): 
The ant bearing grain becomes apprehensive, 
because she is blind to the [mound of] dried husks, 
dragging that grain in worry and fear, 
for she never actually sees the rest of that plentiful chaff. 
The True Owner of the chaff then says, “Woe! 
May you cease to exist because of being blind to what’s next to you! 
Of all our grain you’ve only seen that one 
because your soul is all wrapped up in [wanting] that one grain.” 
O gazer on the form of a speck of grain! Notice Saturn instead! 
You’re like a hobbling ant. Go gaze upon [the guiding prophet] Solomon instead. 
You are not this body. You are that ability to see. 
You’ll be rescued from body once you see (only) the soul. 
A human is all vision; the rest is meat and skin. 
Whatever one’s eyes have seen—that is what one is. 
A vat can cause a mountain to be submerged through its moisture, 
that is, if its passageway opens to the ocean. 
Since a way has opened from the very soul of the vat to the Amu Darya river, 
the vat will rise up forcefully with that running body of water. 
For that reason, God’s command, “Say!” was spoken by the Ocean [of Divinity], 
even when those words were uttered by Muhammad.  
The [Prophet’s] words were all pearls in the ocean, 
for his heart had influence over those waters. 
Since the ocean’s watery bequest can be found in our little vat— 
What wonder is it, really, to find the whole ocean in a fish? 
The eye of sense is fixed upon constant movement: 
you see it all moving, while [in reality] it is still.48 
Such duality comes from the sight of a cross-eyed person; 
were that not the case, the first is just as the last, the last just as the first.49  
 
The description of an ant carrying grain mirrors what is shown in the pivotal hospital 
bedroom scene in Majīdī’s film, which precedes the protagonist’s moral downfall. Rūmī asserts 
that obsession with a particular form, with that which is in our immediate range of sight, comes 
from a failure to recognize the larger, more universal perspective: God masters all. Rūmī redirects 
the listener’s view from the perspective of the “ant,” carrying a single grain, to one who gazes 
upon the stars, or “Saturn.” Then comes his most relevant observation of all, namely, that a human 
chooses to identify with the “body,” the basic drives of the body. Instead, one can and should 
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choose to see “soul,” that is, to make use of a vision that sees beyond mere form and appreciate 
the sense of infinity beyond it and conveyed by it. “A human is all vision,” Rūmī asserts, “the rest 
is meat and skin,” meaning that proper vision—a vision of the reality beyond and behind things—
is the purpose of human existence. Those who choose to see superficially become superficial 
beings; their sight affects their existence: “Whatever one’s eyes have seen—that is what one is.” 
In the context of our film, Yūsuf’s character, his very being, becomes altered as he gains sight and 
misuses it. We watch him descend from being a saintly man (that is, a person in constant 
conversation with God), to a wrathful and selfish one. All this comes to fruition because of the 
choices he makes with his eyes, choices lacking proper perspective. 
 
Conclusion 1: An Ethics of Gazing  
 
 
Perhaps what makes the marriage of Sufi literature and Lacanian psychoanalysis most valuable is 
that it renders Majidi’s film an able vehicle for moral deliberation. The film borrows from Sufi 
texts in which gazing has dangers and moral ends, and yet seems to do so using images that 
resonate with Lacanian psychoanalysis as enriched by studies in feminism. The film, then, 
becomes an opportunity to contemplate the relationship between the imposing eyes of men and the 
objectified female form. Beyond that, sight becomes a metaphor for action that seems to have no 
effect on the outside world, but culminates in potentially harmful moral effects on the subject.50 
As I have argued, this becomes clear in the film’s depiction of the ant crawling through Yūsuf’s 
field of sight. The ant, as the first and last object of sight, represents the fragility of creation, 
including human life. Its bearing the difficult weight of a flake of food represents the difficulties 
that we must endure merely by living. Its subtlety and smallness represents the subtlety of Yūsuf’s 
moral flaw, which becomes increasingly magnified as the film moves on. Indeed, Majidi seems to 
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be evoking a metaphor—the ant representing the subtlety of good or bad intentions—as found in 
the Hadith traditions and celebrated by Muslim theologians and writers. “[The sin of] associating 
partners with God (al-shirk) is more hidden than the crawling of an ant on a stone in the tenebrous 
night,” the Prophet is reported to have said, “and the smallest [instance of] this is to love some part 
of oppression and to hate some part of justice.”51 Rūmī references this famous saying in 
commenting on God’s power to know the minutest of actions and intentions, in his Seven Sessions, 
a collection of his sermons:  
[Be wary of] that all-knowing deity who sees the black ant on a black stone, with 
its narrow legs, in the dark of night, as the ant falls and rises, runs. That Absolute 
Seer—Exalted and Holy—can see how that ant in the tenebrous night, in its actions, 
goes quickly or slowly, or something between the two, whether headed home or to 
get the grain….52   
 
The last part (“whether headed home or to get the grain”) indicates that God’s awareness 
extends not only to subtle actions, but also to intentions. Sight and gazing might seem to the gazer 
as an innocuous activity, but its dangers accumulate as they lead to a change in character. In the 
language of Sufi psychology, as appears in the writings of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, such gazing 
leads to “many diseases of the heart.”53 The gazer will certainly become an oppressor, at the very 
least an oppressor toward himself or herself. For this reason al-Ghazālī comments on Islam’s long 
tradition of enjoining people—especially men—to avert their eyes from those to whom they might 
be attracted but with whom they have no lawful relationship. The Quranic phrase for this is 
“lowering one’s gaze.”54 Al-Ghazālī clarifies that the gaze is a gateway for more insatiable kinds 
of desire and subtle ethical ailments, supporting this view with a saying of the Prophet Muhammad: 
“The gaze is one of Satan’s poisoned arrows, may God curse him. To one who avoids the gaze, 
doing so out of fear of God, God gives belief the sweetness of which he will find in his heart.”55 
Sight as moral responsibility is indeed a major theme of The Willow Tree. Yūsuf’s acts of 
24
Journal of Religion & Film, Vol. 24 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 55
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/jrf/vol24/iss1/55
voyeurism involve a degree of shame, as his facial expressions after being seen gazing convey—
eyes downcast, often with an embarrassed frown. Again, this corresponds to the “conflagration of 
shame” that results from voyeurism as described by Lacan.56 Even more conspicuously, we see 
Yūsuf on the metro witness a pickpocket steal a wallet and keep silent. The thief, once the pilfering 
is done, winks at Yūsuf, implying that he has been an accomplice: Yūsuf’s wrongdoings are silent 
and seemingly passive acts of sight, and yet oppressive nonetheless. Yūsuf becomes aware of sight 
as an activity, what Kaja Silverman calls a “self-conscious subjectivity” as opposed to a “self-
conscious objectivity,” and certainly something more than merely passive viewing.57 In Majidi’s 
cinematic world, sight carries with it moral injunctions: That which should not be seen, and that 
which should be performed when seen. The pleasure that Yūsuf derives from gazing—whether at 
women’s faces or at an act of crime—leads to his final repentance.  
Thus, the gaze, as a moral act, harms not just the object of the gaze, but also the gazer, the 
subject of the gaze. This becomes clearest when Yūsuf’s fixation on form leads to a degeneration 
of his sensibilities. Once Yūsuf’s family has left him, for example, we begin to see how gazing 
can become a fixation: While his uncle tries to help him salvage his marriage, career, and life, 
Yūsuf cannot help but stare at a mannequin being carried on a motorcycle. Yūsuf’s preoccupation 
with form leads him to his immersion with a sculpted and bare depiction of the human form. 
Likewise, when walking along the streets of Tehran, Yūsuf finds himself mesmerized by 
televisions, especially when, in one case, a television connected to a camera serves as a mirror and 
shows him his reflection. In this, Majidi asks his audience to consider ways in which fixation on 
form can alter and corrupt not just the individual, but also society. The downtown area of the city 
is always depicted as a place of confusion and loss for Yūsuf, in opposition to his home in the hills, 
on the outskirts of the city, a location with pastoral resonances. One can observe this contrast 
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between idyllic scenes of nature as opposed to grey and sometimes desperate scenes of city life in 
Majidi's other films as well, especially Children of Heaven and The Color of Paradise. The city is 
a place of images, while Yūsuf had once lived in a world of words, whether in his study of Sufi 
poetry or in his monologues directed at God. Among words, Yūsuf was protected from the divorce 
of form from meaning that images offer to him. To some degree, Majidi’s valorization of words 
over images has a long history in Islamic metaphysics: Medieval Sufi writings often mention the 
visual arts—especially drawing—in mostly disparaging contexts, because they facilitate a type of 
perception bereft of meaning. For example, Ibn al-ʿArabī describes the colors and lines of wall 
paintings as “devoid of spirit,” as opposed to poetry, which has both form and spirit.58 Yet Majidi 
has clearly recognized a phenomenon conspicuous and easily recognizable as “modern,” namely, 
the image-centric media foregrounded in contemporary experience. Such depictions of city life, 
inspired by Sufi texts, clearly share a perspective offered by Marxist criticisms of commodity 
fetishism. 
 
Conclusion 2: The Gaze as Traditionalist Critique  
 
 
The latter half of The Willow Tree, in representing Yūsuf’s indifference to his family and to his 
study of Sufi poetry, shows us a man who has redefined the ends and pursuits of his life: He seeks 
a sort of beauty that can only be found among the artificially decorated younger women of 
Tehran.59 As a commentary on an ethics of sight, this change in Yūsuf is a critique of representation 
and image-centric desire, the sort of critique one finds in the writings of Guy Debord. Debord 
presented Marxist theory with a special focus on representation, the manner in which direct 
experience in the form of sensory perception of the natural world loses its place of privilege to 
idealized, perceptible, and yet absent images—most specifically, the commodity. In the 
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commodity, and in the commodity fetishism of late capitalism, “the perceptible world is replaced 
by a set of images,” which are both easily grasped and more perfect.60 For Debord, commodity 
fetishism redirects the powers of traditional ways of life—religion and family structures—toward 
worldly ends, encouraging the seeking of gratification in what is produced, directing 
dissatisfaction toward acquisition.61 This results in a pacification of the subject, who faces a world 
that is both present and absent, present in its being desired, but absent in that it is an ideal and 
ultimately unattainable. The subject succumbs to a cycle of wanting and being thwarted in 
fulfillment, and so is “driven into a form of madness in which, by resorting to magical devices, he 
entertains the illusion that he is reacting to this fate;” that is, while the subject sees himself as a 
free and willing actor, he has become a machine.62 Yūsuf’s interest in “artificial” women leaves 
him with no interest in helping the blind, planting trees, playing at the creek with his daughter, 
contemplating God, or indeed any of the pursuits that once absorbed his attention. He seeks images, 
everywhere he goes, but spirals into a rage of discontent when he gains nothing. Whether Yūsuf 
represents a modernizing Iran, the middle-aged man, or the embodied human soul, in all cases, he 
is a victim of a shift toward representation and away from traditional modes of human engagement 
with the natural world. 
Beyond Yūsuf, the object of his gaze is, of course, a victim as well, fetishized and 
objectified, and hence deprived of “meaning,” or, if one prefers, “humanity.” Enduring his gaze, 
the unknowing object of the gazer’s assault, the object of that gaze, becomes less bound by the 
actual reality of humanity and more idealized, more of a mannequin than a human being. (Indeed, 
as mentioned, Yūsuf’s gaze eventually falls on mannequins too.) With the film’s critical depiction 
of modernity and the city, nothing seems more fitting to describe the artificiality the gazed-upon 
object as Talal Asad’s observation, building on the work of Alain Corbin, that engagement with 
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sensory stimuli has changed after the onset of modern, urbanized life. Asad argues that more 
traditional ways of seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, and tasting have been altered or replaced.63 
As an example, while perfumes, such as musk, in the eighteenth century complemented the natural 
scents of perspiration, modern fixations on cleanliness and even sterility have brought us to dislike 
natural body odors, preferring instead perfumes and soaps that “disguise body odor” while offering 
some alternative presented as clean and feminine.64 This resonates with the theme of degeneration 
that appears in The Willow Tree, which, perhaps more than anything else, offers a view of the 
artificiality of our objects of desire. It is ironic that such criticism of modern perception occurs in 
film, considering film’s place of privilege in the exaltation of images. After all, Walter Benjamin 
famously identified film’s role in human perception as a “training ground,” one that acclimates its 
viewers to a new, technological reality of “distraction.”65 In this regard, Majidi’s critique of image-
centeredness indicates the culturally subversive potential of postcolonial cinema. 
The gaze in The Willow Tree represents more than the same gaze men have imposed upon 
women throughout history. The gaze becomes tied to modernity and to technology, and, in this, 
becomes a means to interpret modern ways of living. The abstraction of form from meaning occurs 
within a context of distance, the sort of unprecedented distance that only modern life allows. Of 
course, human technologies have always by their very nature allowed for distance. Interactions are 
mediated, and that mediation is the very nature of technology. It is the distance that I have between 
me and the task, or between me and the idea on paper, or between me and the destination or 
instance of communication. In other words, while humans have always created means for distance, 
they have, of late, done so more successfully and with more ubiquity.66 As such, humans have 
created means for separation between the sense of doing something and actually doing something. 
We have created a propensity to consume without feeling appropriately consumptive. The assault 
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of the eyes does not seem to be assault, and yet “seeing immorally”—if the film is to be believed—
leads to an outlook of insatiability, consumption, narcissism, and frustration that has no resolution. 
To use Sufi terminology, if “meaning” underlies all “form,” then there can come a point when one 
seeks form for the sake of form, image for the sake of image, and loses access to meaning. In a 
philosophically different but remarkably pertinent context, we might think of Plotinus’s 
declaration to his friend Amelius, who wanted to have a painting or sculpture made of the 
philosopher: “Why, really, is it not enough to have to carry the image in which nature has encased 
us, without your requesting me to agree to leave behind a longer lasting image of the image, as if 
it were something genuinely worth looking at?”67 It is not that—at least, in the context of Sufi 
literature—the body presents a moral danger to the viewer, but rather the body abstracted from 
contexts of meaning, the human form as idealized by the gazer’s desire, divorced from the meaning 
(the spirit as a sense of borrowed divinity) it conveys. To me, this is the most pertinent theme in 
Majidi’s film, and a point for further exploration. Forms as objects of longing and perfection lend 
themselves to artificiality because—whether in Lacan’s system or Sufi metaphysics—humans 
choose the controlled symbolic as a means of escape from the uncontrollable real. It is as though 
sight itself can become a mode of blindness, and, perhaps for this reason, Majidi presents blindness 
as a mode of vision.68   
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